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本文在财政分权的框架下研究中央政府和地方政府的最优税收结构,证明了均衡时地方政府的最优税收是征收消费税;通过数值模拟比较中央政府征收消费税和资本税时所对应的均衡产出和社会福利,发现中央政府的最优税收也是征收消费税。此时由地方政府向中央政府进行转移支付,中央政府的消费税与地方政府的消费税之间存在固定的比例关系。
This paper studies the optimal tax structure of central government and local government under the framework of fiscal decentralization and proves that the optimal tax of local government is the consumption tax levied when the equilibrium is balanced. The equilibrium between the consumption tax and the capital tax levied by the central government is compared by numerical simulation Output and social welfare, found that the optimal tax of the central government is also the consumption tax. At this point, the local government transfers the payment to the central government. There is a fixed proportional relationship between the consumption tax of the central government and the consumption tax of the local government.