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针对光伏电站质量优化利益分配问题,在系统分析相关利益主体属性及博弈关系的基础上,考虑到电站质量优化存在的风险,结合主体对收益分配的公平关切及决策过程的学习性,构建了承包商和运营商参与的两主体利益分配模型。研究了仅承包商具有公平关切性、仅运营商具有公平关切性和双方均具有公平关切性三种实验情景下,系统利益分配的可行域、博弈结果及系统风险水平。实验结果表明:主体公平关切性越大,利益分配可行域越小、主体自身收益越大;运营商公平关切性越大,将导致自身收益越大而承包商收益越小,承包商增加成本投入的积极性越小,系统风险也越大;承包商公平关切性越大,将导致自身收益越大而运营商收益越小,承包商将愿意增加更多的成本投入,系统风险也随之减小。
Aiming at the problem of optimal distribution of power quality in photovoltaic power station, based on systematically analyzing the relevant stakeholder attributes and game relationship, taking into account the risk of power station quality optimization, combined with the subject’s fair interest in income distribution and the learning of decision-making process, Business and operators involved in the two principal distribution of benefits model. The feasible region, the game result and the systematic risk level of the system profit distribution under the three experimental scenarios that only contractors have fair concerns, only operators have fair concerns, and both parties have fair concerns are studied. The experimental results show that the bigger the main body’s fairness concern is, the smaller the feasible distribution area of interest is and the bigger the main body’s own revenue is. The larger the operator’s fairness concern will lead to the bigger self-benefit and the smaller contractor’s income, The less positivity and the higher systematic risk. The bigger the fair concern of the contractor, the bigger its own revenue and the smaller the operator’s profit. The contractor will be willing to increase more cost and the system risk will decrease accordingly .