本文首先界定了“官煤一体化”的问题,构建了三角利益模型,并以理想三角的变形为切入点,着眼于地方政府和矿主这条边的变化,运用内外部共同作用力来分析官煤这条边上两个主体的博弈情况,从而得出监管悖论是内外部原因共同作用的结果。 This article first defines the issue of “integration of government and coal”, constructs the triangular interest model, and takes the deformation of the ideal triangle as the starting point, focusing on the changes of the local government and the mine owner, using internal and external forces to analyze This side of the coal on this side of the game between the two main bodies, and thus come to a regulatory paradox is the result of both internal and external reasons.