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本文首先描述中国公共危机预防投入的现状,指出我国政府存在公共危机预防投入不足问题,尤其是地方政府。然后运用政治经济学的理论和方法,基于公共危机政府支出的政治经济学模型,从政治经济学的视角分析此问题,并提出相应的对策。本文的主要观点是,公共危机政府预防投入不足问题的主要原因在于公共危机发生的概率不确定;政府的社会福利效用相对于收入效用过低;政府对公共危机预防对事后救济的替代作用认识不足;外部事后救济支援的存在。解决公共危机政府预防投入不足问题长期需要政治经济的发展,建立预防为主的公共危机管理文化;短期内增加地方政府公共危机预防投入可由中央政府进行管制或者激励。
This article first describes the status quo of China’s public crisis prevention investment and points out that there is a problem of insufficient public investment prevention in our government, especially local governments. Then using the theory and method of political economy, based on the political economy model of government expenditure in public crisis, this problem is analyzed from the perspective of political economy and corresponding countermeasures are put forward. The main point of this article is that the main reason why the public crisis prevents the government from investing in the insufficiency is that the probability of the public crisis is uncertain. The utility of the government’s welfare relative to the income is too low. The government is not aware of the substitute effect of the public crisis prevention to the post- External ex post relief support exists. Solving the public crisis The problem of inadequate investment in government prevention requires the political and economic development in the long run and the establishment of a culture of public crisis management based on prevention. In the short term, increasing investment in prevention of public crises by local governments can be controlled or motivated by the central government.