经理人员的不正当干涉一直是导致许多企业财务报表严重失真的直接原因 ,本文利用风险厌恶假设下的效用函数模型 ,对传统体制下企业经理人员的效用选择进行了分析 ,并得出其虚假会计信息的必然性。接下来 ,本文对改变经理人员效用选择的方式及当前实施各种方式的难点作了进一步的探讨。在此基础上 ,笔者还试着对会计委派制的产生动因及其发展趋势进行了解释和预测 The improper intervention by managers has been the direct cause of the serious distortion of financial statements of many enterprises. In this paper, the utility function model under the assumption of risk aversion is used to analyze the utility choice of managers under the traditional system. The inevitability of information. Next, this paper further discusses the ways to change the utility choice of managers and the difficulties in implementing various methods. On this basis, I also try to explain and predict the formation of accounting appointments and their development trend