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“资产负债表衰退”假说认为,当出现资产(主要是股票和房地产)价格大幅度下跌,私人部门的经济行为目标会发生重大变化,由追求利润最大化转变成追求债务最小化,企业或个人会把新增加收益的大部分用于还债而不是用于再投资,信贷需求陷入停滞或减少,中央银行刺激信贷的政策操作会失效,经济出现恶性循环。直到微观主体的资产负债表修复正常,经济运行才恢复到正常状态。该理论假说能很好地解释20世纪30年代的美国大萧条及20世纪90年代日本经济泡沫破灭后的衰退。根据该分析思路,中国在2003至2005年期间也出现过小规模的资产负债表型衰退,但仅仅局限于股票市场,对宏观经济的全局影响甚小。我国2009年初的信贷高速增长有可能会导致资产负债表型衰退,应该引起决策层的高度关注。
“Balance sheet recession ” hypothesis that when the prices of assets (mainly stocks and real estate) drop sharply, the private sector’s economic behavior will change significantly from the pursuit of profit maximization to the pursuit of debt minimization. The enterprises Or individuals will use most of the newly added proceeds for debt repayment rather than for reinvestment, the credit demand will be stalled or reduced, and the central bank will lapse in the policy of stimulating credit and the economy will have a vicious cycle. Until the microscopic main body of the balance sheet is repaired normally, economic operation returned to normal. This theoretical hypothesis provides a good explanation for the recession in the 1930s during the Great Depression and the collapse of Japan’s economic bubble in the 1990s. According to this analysis, China also experienced a small-scale decline in the balance sheet during the period from 2003 to 2005, but it was limited to the stock market with little impact on the overall macroeconomic situation. China’s rapid credit growth in early 2009 may lead to the decline of the balance sheet, which should arouse the concern of policy makers.