论文部分内容阅读
被视为“中国萨班斯法案”的《企业内部控制基本规范》及其配套指引明确要求我国主板上市公司从2012年起全面进行内部控制建设,并要求外部独立审计师对内部控制状况进行全面鉴证并公开出具审计报告。基于此,本文以我国主板上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了强制内部控制是否切实提高了上市公司所披露信息的可靠性。研究发现,外部审计师对于上市公司内部控制的审计并没有减少上市公司的财务重述行为,企业披露信息的可靠性没有明显地提升;进一步以我国市场特有的“双事务所”审计的上市公司为样本,检验发现聘用两个事务所分别进行财务报告审计和内控审计确实会降低财务重述行为发生的可能性。本文对研究我国内部控制政策的实施效果、后续政策改进以及提升上市公司披露信息的可靠性具有一定的启示作用。
The “Basic Standards for Corporate Internal Control” and its supporting guidelines that are regarded as China’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act clearly require that China’s main board listed companies fully implement internal control construction from 2012, and require external independent auditors to control internal control. Conduct comprehensive verification and publicly issue audit reports. Based on this, this paper takes China’s main board listed company as a research sample, and empirically tests whether the compulsory internal control actually improves the reliability of the information disclosed by the listed company. The study finds that the external auditors’ audit of the internal control of the listed company did not reduce the financial restatement behavior of the listed company, and the reliability of the disclosed information of the company did not increase significantly; further, it was audited by the “double firm’s” unique to the Chinese market. The listed company is a sample. The test found that hiring two firms to conduct financial report auditing and internal control auditing respectively would indeed reduce the possibility of financial restatement. This article has a certain enlightenment to the study of the implementation effect of China’s internal control policy, the follow-up policy improvement, and the improvement of the reliability of listed company disclosure information.