论文部分内容阅读
现代企业制度的显著特征就是企业的所有权与经营权相分离,出资者享受全部剩余,经营者的收入是工资。由于这种状态的激励强度较小,容易诱发代理问题,即经营者有可能利用信息不对称条件以非法手段获得利益。如何构造出出资者与经营者之间具有共同利益的激励机制,使经营者和所有者激励趋于相容,成为当务之急。本文拟对此作一分析并提出相应的建议。
The salient feature of the modern enterprise system is the separation of ownership and management of the enterprise. The investor enjoys all the surplus and the manager's income is salary. Because of the less incentive intensity in this state, it is easy to induce the agency problem, that is, the manager may use the asymmetric information to obtain the benefits illegally. How to construct an incentive mechanism that has common interests between the investor and the operator and make the encouragement of the operator and the owner more compatible becomes a top priority. This article intends to make an analysis and put forward corresponding suggestions.