存货影响销售量的两阶段供应链的VMI协调

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研究在VMI环境下存货影响销售量的单供应商、单零售商的两阶段供应链的协调问题。建立了集中决策下的供应链模型,求出了整体供应链的利润函数;在分散决策下,采用收益共享契约对供应链进行协调,按Stackelberg博弈方式进行建模分析,发现收益共享契约无法协调供应链,即在利益分配上,与供应商相比,零售商获得了更多的供应链收益,而且分散式系统的收益始终低于集中决策下的水平;采用Nash协商对VMI供应链进行协调,完成了供应商和零售商收益的帕累托改进,不仅实现供应链的协调,而且达到了集中决策下的水平,最后通过算例进行了验证。 This paper investigates the coordination of two-stage supply chain between single-supplier and single-retailer whose inventory affects sales in the VMI environment. The supply chain model under the centralized decision was established and the profit function of the whole supply chain was obtained. Under the decentralized decision-making, the revenue sharing contract was used to coordinate the supply chain and the Stackelberg game was used to analyze the model. It was found that the revenue sharing contract could not be coordinated In the supply chain, in the distribution of benefits, retailers gain more supply chain returns compared with suppliers, and the profit of decentralized systems is always lower than that of centralized decision-making. Coordination of VMI supply chain is conducted by using Nash negotiation , Pareto improvement, which completes the profit of suppliers and retailers, not only realized supply chain coordination but also reached the level of centralized decision-making, and finally verified by examples.
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