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逆向选择情形下,代理人拥有的私人信息对委托人与代理人博弈的均衡结果有着至关重要的影响。实际上,逆向选择过程中委托人面临的问题可分为两个阶段:一是对信息系统的选择,二是在给定信息系统下的机制设计问题。现有文献往往关注后一阶段信息系统既定情况下的机制设计问题,本文研究的是第一阶段信息系统的选择标准。在代理人效用函数特定的基础上,当代理人能力的分布函数G(y)一阶随机占优于分布函数F(y),委托人相对于信息系统G(y)更偏好于信息系统F(y),即一阶随机占优(FSD)是逆向选择情形下信息系统占优的充分条件。
In the case of adverse selection, the private information owned by the agent has a crucial influence on the equilibrium result of the game between the principal and the agent. In fact, the problems faced by the principal in the process of adverse selection can be divided into two stages: one is the choice of information system and the other is the mechanism design problem under a given information system. The existing literature tends to pay attention to the issue of mechanism design in the latter stage of information system. This paper studies the selection criteria of the first stage of information system. On the basis of agent-specific utility function, when the distribution function G (y) of agent ability predominates over the distribution function F (y) at random, the principal prefers information system F (y) to information system F (y), that is, the first order stochastic dominance (FSD) is the sufficient condition for information systems to dominate in the case of adverse selection.