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演化心理学家提出了大规模模块论题,该论题设定,人类心智几乎完全是由先天的、领域特定的心理模块构成,它与福多对心理模块的原始界定有重大区别。本文首先刻画了模块概念从福多定义到卡鲁瑟斯定义的演变逻辑,并检验这个转变的合理性。在莱斯和曼舍尼对于卡鲁瑟斯关于内容融合问题批评的基础上,文章论证指出,即使大规模模块论题可以避开中央语义系统的概念形成难题,但在卡鲁瑟斯提供的认知架构解释框架中,演化心理学仍无法说明人类思维特有的心理灵活性是如何产生的。
Evolutionary psychologists have proposed a large-scale modular theory that sets the human mind to be almost entirely composed of innate, domain-specific mental modules that are significantly different from Fodor’s original definition of mental modules. This paper first depicts the evolutionary logic of the module concept from the Fodor definition to the Karuthers definition and examines the rationality of this transition. Based on Critique of Karoous’s criticism on content fusion, Rice’s article argues that even if large-scale modular topics avoid the conceptual formation of the central semantic system, In the framework of the framework of interpretation, evolutionary psychology still can not explain how the unique mental flexibility of human thinking is generated.