假设管理者具有市场能力,研究委托组合投资管理中线性合同的激励作用.与以前研究结论不同的是,在管理者具有市场能力时,管理者的资产选择影响市场的均衡价格,线性合同能激励管理者去努力搜集信息.风险厌恶的管理者的最优努力水平是其风险分享比例的增函数,说明线性合同不但可以使风险在投资者和管理者之间进行最优分担,而且可以激励管理者的努力水平. Suppose managers have the market ability to study the incentive effect of the linear contract in the portfolio management.Different from the previous research conclusion, when the manager has the market ability, the manager’s asset choice affects the equilibrium price of the market and the linear contract can stimulate Managers strive to collect information.The optimal level of risk-averse managers is an increasing function of their risk-sharing ratio, indicating that linear contracts can not only make the optimal allocation of risk between investors and managers, but also encourage management The level of effort.