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以中国沪深股市2007—2013年上市公司为样本,从银行债权人缺失的视角实证检验零杠杆政策对股东与管理层间代理冲突的影响。结果表明:由于银行债权人的缺失,零杠杆公司中因股东与管理层间的代理冲突所产生的代理成本显著高于杠杆公司;零杠杆政策的持续时间越长,由股东与管理层间的代理冲突所产生的代理成本就越大;此外,公司采用零杠杆“进入”决策时,零杠杆“进入”决策当年的代理成本显著高于“进入”决策前一年度的代理成本。
Taking the listed companies in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for 2007-2013 as a sample, this paper empirically tests the impact of zero leverage on the agency conflicts between shareholders and management from the perspective of the lack of bank creditors. The result shows that due to the lack of bank creditors, the agency costs of the zero-leveraged company due to the conflict between the shareholders and the management agency are significantly higher than that of the leveraged companies. The longer the zero-leverage policy is, the more the agency between the shareholders and the management In addition, the agency cost of the year of zero leverage “entry ” decision is significantly higher than that of the previous year of “entry ” decision when the company adopts zero leverage “entry ” decision cost.