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在委托代理视域中,委托方与代理方在利益取向和信息分布中的差异,导致了在实际代理过程中容易产生代理行为变异的问题。在基层的治理实践中,并非所有基层政府都能全面回应中央政府整齐划一的政策要求,这种情况下,基层政府大多采取“共谋”的方式来应对上级的监督与考查。在压力型体制的约束性和激励性双重作用下,催生了H省社区矫正系统中拥有不同基础要素基础的各级部门迥异的行动逻辑,进而推动了政府体系内部共谋的衍生和发展。基层政府间的共谋行为之所以如此屡见不鲜,归根结底是由于共谋能够为基层行政规避风险、争取利益。简言之,基层政府间的共谋行为是其在理性逻辑下的一种策略性选择。
In the field of principal-agent representation, the differences between principal-agent and agent in the direction of interests and distribution of information lead to the problem that proxy behavior variation easily occurs in the actual agency process. In the practice of grassroots governance, not all grassroots governments can fully respond to the uniform and uniform policy requirements of the Central Government. In this case, the grassroots governments mostly adopt the method of “conspiracy” to cope with the supervision and examination of their superiors. Under the constraint and motivation of the pressure-type system, the action logic of different departments at different levels in different parts of the community correction system in H Province is spawned, which in turn promotes the derivation and development of conspiracies within the government system. The reason why the collusion between grassroots governments is so frequent is that collusion can be used to sidestep the risks and strive for benefits for the grass-roots administration. In short, collusive behavior among grass-roots governments is a strategic choice under rational logic.