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近年来,转型经济国家的分权改革对经济的影响问题受到了学术界的广泛关注。以中国上市公司为研究样本,从微观角度考察了地方政府竞争对国有企业投资行为的影响,以及地方政府与企业管理层存在利益冲突的情况下,这一影响的变化。研究结果表明,地方政府竞争会显著地影响国有企业的投资行为,地方政府(官员)为了赶超那些经济发展程度相对较高的地区,会对国有企业施加影响,促使它们扩大投资规模;对于那些地方政府更容易控制的国有企业来说,更是如此。但是,国有企业的管理层为了持续地获得私有收益,他们会抵制政府的这种干预,在一定程度上抑制了企业的过度投资水平。
In recent years, the economic impact of decentralized reforms in transitional economies has received widespread academic attention. Taking the listed companies in China as a sample, this paper examines the impact of local government competition on the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises from a micro perspective and the changes in the impact of the conflict of interest between the local government and the corporate management. The results show that local government competition will significantly affect the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises. Local governments (officials) will exert influence on state-owned enterprises in order to catch up with those areas with relatively higher degree of economic development and encourage them to expand the investment scale. For those who This is even more so for state-owned enterprises that are easier for local governments to control. However, in order to continuously obtain private benefits, the management of state-owned enterprises will resist such government intervention, to a certain extent, curb the excessive investment of enterprises.